Abstract-We consider an instance of a nonatomic routing game. We assume that the network is parallel, that is, constituted of only two nodes, an origin and a destination. We consider infinitesimal players that have a symmetric network cost, but are heterogeneous through their set of feasible strategies and their individual utilities. We show that if an atomic routing game instance is correctly defined to approximate the nonatomic instance, then an atomic Nash Equilibrium will approximate the nonatomic Wardrop Equilibrium. We give explicit bounds on the distance between the equilibria according to the parameters of the atomic instance. This approximation gives a method to compute the Wardrop equilibrium at an arbitrary precision.
I. INTRODUCTION
Motivation. Network routing games have been considered first by Rosenthal [1] in their "atomic" version, where a finite set of players share a network subject to congestion. Routing games found later on many practical applications not only in transport [2] , [3] , but also in communications [4] , distributed computing [5] , and energy [6] . The different models studied are of three main categories: nonatomic games (where there is a continuum of infinitesimal players), atomic games (with a finite number of players, each one choosing a path to her destination), and atomic splittable games (where there is a finite number of players, each one choosing how to split her weight on the set of available paths).
The concept of equilibrium is central in game theory, as it corresponds to a "stable" situation, where no player has interest to deviate. With a finite number of playersan atomic game-it is captured by the concept of Nash Equilibrium [7] . With an infinite number of infinitesimal players-the nonatomic case-the problem is different: deviations from a finite number of players have no impact, which led Wardrop to its definition of equilibria for nonatomic games [2] . However, when one considers the limit game of an atomic game where players become infinitely many, one obtains a nonatomic instance with infinitesimal players, and expects a relationship between the atomic equilibria and the Wardrop equilibrium of the limit nonatomic game. This is the question we address in this paper.
Main results. We propose a quantitative analysis of the link between a nonatomic routing game and a family of related atomic routing games, in which the number of players grows. A novelty from the existing literature is that, for nonatomic instances, we consider a very general setting where players in the continuum [0, 1] have specific abstract convex strategy-sets, the profile of which being given as a mapping from [0, 1] to R T , where T is the number of arcs in the network. In addition to the conventional network (congestion) cost, we consider individual utility function which is also heterogeneous among the continuum of players. For a nonatomic game of this form, we formulate the notion of an atomic approximating sequence, composed of instances of atomic splittable games closer and closer to the nonatomic instance. Our main results state the convergence of Nash equilibria (NE) associated to an approximating sequence to the Wardrop equilibrium (WE) of the nonatomic instance. In particular, Thm. 6 gives the convergence of aggregate NE flows to the aggregate WE flow in R T in the case of convex and strictly increasing price/congestion functions without individual utility; Thm. 7 states the convergence of NE to the WE in functional space (R T ) [0, 1] in the case of strongly concave utility functions. For each result we provide an upper bound on the convergence rate, given from the atomic instances parameters. An implication of these new results concerns the computation of an equilibrium of a nonatomic instance. Although computing an NE is a hard problem in general [8] , there exist several algorithms to compute an NE through its formulation with finite-dimensional variational inequalities [9] . For a Wardrop Equilibrium, a similar formulation with infinite-dimensional variational inequalities can be written, but finding a solution is much harder.
Related work. Some results have already been given to quantify the relation between Nash and Wardrop equilibria. Haurie and Marcotte [10] show that in a sequence of atomic splittable games where atomic splittable players split themselves into smaller and smaller equal-size players, the Nash equilibria converges to the Wardrop equilibrium of a nonatomic game. Their proof is based on the convergence of variational inequalities corresponding to the sequence of Nash equilibria, a technique similar to the one used in this paper. Wan [11] generalizes this result to composite games, by allowing the atomic players to split themselves into small players with heterogeneous sizes. In [12] , the authors consider an aggregative game with linear coupling constraints (generalized game) and show that the Nash Variational equilibrium can be approximated by the so-called Wardrop Variational equilibrium. The latter is defined for a game with a finite number of players when an atomic player considers that her action has no impact on the aggregate profile. They do not study the relation between atomic and nonatomic equilibria, as done in this paper. Finally, Milchtaich [13] studies atomic unsplittable and nonatomic crowding games, where players are of equal weight and each player's payoff depends on her own action and on the number of players choosing the same action. He shows that, if each atomic unsplittable player in an n-person finite game is replaced by m identical replicas with constant total weight, the equilibria generically converge to the unique equilibrium of the corresponding nonatomic game as m goes to infinity. Last, Marcotte and Zhu [3] consider nonatomic players with continuous types (leading to a characterization of the Wardrop equilibrium as a infinite-dimensional variational inequality) and studied the equilibrium in an aggregative game with an infinity of nonatomic players, differentiated through a linear parameter in their cost function and their feasibility sets assumed to be convex polyhedral.
Structure. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Sec. II, we give the definitions of atomic and nonatomic routing games. We recall the associated concepts of Nash and Wardrop equilibria, their characterization via variational inequalities, and sufficient conditions of existence. Then, in Sec. III, we give the definition of an approximating sequence of a nonatomic game, and we give our two main theorems on the convergence of the sequence of Nash equilibria to a Wardrop equilibrium of the nonatomic game. Last, in Sec. IV we provide a numerical example of an approximation of a particular nonatomic routing game.
II. SPLITTABLE ROUTING: ATOMIC AND NONATOMIC

A. Atomic Splittable Routing Game
An atomic splittable routing game on parallel arcs is defined with a network constituted of a finite number of parallel links (cf Fig. 1 ) on which players can load some weight. Each "link" can be thought as a road, a communication channel or a time slot on which each user can put a load or a task. Associated to each link is a cost or "latency" function that depends only on the total load put on this link. 
Def 1. Atomic Routing Game
An instance G of an atomic routing game is defined by:
• a finite set of players I = {1, . . . , I},
• a finite set of arcs T = {1, . . . , T },
• for each i ∈ I, a feasibility set
• for each t ∈ T , a cost or latency function c t (.) : R → R .
Each atomic player i ∈ I chooses a profile (x i,t ) t∈T in her feasible set X i and minimizes her cost function:
composed of the network cost and her utility, where
The instance G can be written as the tuple:
where X := X 1 × · · · × X I and c = (c t ) t∈T .
In this paper, the notation G will be used for an instance of an atomic game (Def. 1).
Owing to the network cost structure (1), the aggregate load plays a central role. We denote it by X t := i∈I x i,t on each arc t, and denote the associated feasibility set by: (1), atomic routing games are a particular case of aggregative games: each player's cost function depends on the others only through the aggregate profile X.
For technical reasons, we make the following assumptions:
is differentiable, convex and (strictly) increasing.
Asm 2. Compact strategy sets For each i ∈ I, the set X i is assumed to be nonempty, convex and compact.
Asm 3. Concave utilities Each utility function u i is differentiable and concave.
Note that under Asms. 1 and 3, each function f i is convex in x i .
An example that has drawn particular attention is the case of splittable routing games [4] , described below: Ex 1. Each player i has a weight E i to split over T . In this case, X i is given as the simplex:
t x i,t = E i and x i,t ≤ x i,t ≤ x i,t } . E i can be the mass of data to be sent over different canals, or the amount of energy to be consumed over a set of time periods [14] . In the energy applications, more complex models include for instance "ramping" constraints r i,t ≤ x i,t+1 − x i,t ≤ r i,t .
Ex 2. An important example of utility function is the distance to a preferred profile
where y i = (y i,t ) t∈T . and ω i > 0 is the value of player i's preference. Another type of utility function that found many applications is u i (x i ) = −ω i log (1 + t x i,t ), which increases with the total weight player i is able to load on T .
Below we recall the central notion of Nash Equilibrium in atomic non-cooperative games.
Def 2. Nash Equilibrium (NE)
An NE of the atomic game G = (I, X , (f i ) i ) is a profilê x ∈ X such that for each player i ∈ I:
Prop 1. Variational Formulation of an NE
Under Asms. 1 to 3,x ∈ X is an NE of G if and only if:
Proof. (4) is the necessary and sufficient first order condition forx i to be a minimum of the convex function f i (.,x −i ).
Def. 1 defines a convex minimization game so that the existence of an NE is a corollary of Rosen's results [15] :
Thm 1 (Cor. of Rosen, 1965) . Existence of an NE If G is an atomic routing congestion game (Def. 1) satisfying Asms. 1 to 3, then there exists an NE of G.
In general, an NE is not unique in a routing congestion game [4] . To the best of our knowledge, for atomic parallel routing games (Def. 1) and under Asms. 1 to 3, neither the NE uniqueness nor a counter-example of uniqueness has ever been given. However, there are some particular cases where uniqueness has been shown, e.g. [14] for the case of Ex. 1. Rosen [15] gave a uniqueness theorem applying to any convex compact strategy sets, relying on a strong monotonicity condition of the operator (∇ xi f i ) i .
However, for the convergence theorems of Sec. III, uniqueness of NE is not necessary to ensure the convergence of NE of a sequence of atomic games.
B. An Infinity of Players: the Nonatomic Framework
If there is an infinity of players, the structure of the game changes: the action of a single player has a negligible impact on the aggregate load on each link. To measure the impact of infinitesimal players, we equip Euclidean spaces with the usual Lebesgue measure µ.
The set of players is now represented by a continuum Θ = [0, 1]. Each player is of Lebesgue measure 0.
Def 3. Nonatomic Routing Game
An instance G of a nonatomic routing game is defined by:
• a continuum of players Θ = [0, 1], • a finite set of arcs T = {1, . . . , T }, • a point-to-set mapping of feasibility sets
Each nonatomic player θ chooses a profile x θ = (x θ,t ) t∈T in her feasible set X θ and minimizes her cost function:
where X t := Θ x θ,t dθ denotes the aggregate load. The nonatomic instance G can be written as the tuple:
For the nonatomic case, we need stronger assumptions than Asms. 2 and 3 for the mappings X . and u., given below: Asm 4. Nonatomic strategy sets There exists M > 0 such that, for any θ ∈ Θ, X θ is convex, compact and X θ ⊂ B 0 (M ), where B 0 (M ) is the centered ball of radius M . Moreover, the mapping θ → X θ has a measurable graph
Asm 5. Nonatomic utilities There exists Γ > 0 s.t. for each θ, u θ is differentiable, (strictly) concave and ∇u θ ∞ < Γ.
Def. 3 and Asms. 4 and 5 give a very general framework. In many models of nonatomic games that have been considered, players are considered homogeneous or with a finite number of classes [16, Chapter 18] 
As each player is infinitesimal, her action has a negligible impact on the other players costs. Wardrop [2] extended the notion of equilibrium to the nonatomic case.
Def 4. Wardrop Equilibrium (WE)
x * ∈ (X θ ) θ is a Wardrop equilibrium of the game G if it is a measurable function from θ to X and for almost all θ ∈ Θ,
where
Prop 2. Variational formulation of a WE Under Asms. 1, 4 and 5, x * ∈ X is a WE of G if and only if for almost all θ ∈ Θ:
Proof. Given X * , (7) is the necessary and sufficient first order condition for x * θ to be a minimum point of the convex function F θ (., X * ). Details are given in [17] .
As seen in (7), the monotonicity of c is sufficient to have the VI characterization of the equilibrium in the nonatomic case, as opposed to the atomic case in (4) where monotonicity and convexity of c are needed.
Thm 2 (Cor. of Rath, 1992 [18] ). Existence of a WE If G is a nonatomic routing congestion game (Def. 3) satisfying Asms. 1, 4 and 5, then there exists a WE of G.
Proof. The conditions asked in [18] are satisfied. Note that we only need (c t ) t and (u θ ) θ∈Θ to be continuous functions.
Note that the variational formulation of a WE given above (Prop. 2) can be written in the closed form: Thm 3. Under Asms. 1, 4 and 5, x * ∈ X is a WE of G iff:
Proof. See [17] for the details of the proof.
Cor 1.
In the case where u θ ≡ 0 for all θ ∈ Θ, under Asms. 1 and 4, x * ∈ X is a WE of G iff:
From the characterization of the WE in Thm. 3 and Cor. 1, we can derive the Thms. 4 and 5 below that state simple conditions ensuring the uniqueness of a WE in G. T → R T is a strictly monotone operator, then all the WE of G have the same aggregate profile X * ∈ X .
Rem 1. If for each t ∈ T , c t (.) is (strictly) increasing, then c is a (strictly) monotone operator from
One expects that, when the number of players grows very large in an atomic instance, the game gets close to a nonatomic game in some sense. We confirm this intuition by showing that, considering a sequence of equilibria of approximating atomic games of a nonatomic instance, the sequence converges to a WE of the nonatomic instance.
III. APPROXIMATING NONATOMIC GAMES
To approximate the nonatomic game G, the idea is to find a sequence of atomic games (G (ν) ) with increasing number of players, each player representing a "class" of nonatomic players, similar in their parameters.
As the players θ ∈ Θ are differentiated through X θ and u θ , we need to formulate the convergence of the feasibility sets and utilities of atomic instances to the nonatomic parameters.
A. Approximating the nonatomic instance
Def 5. Atomic Approximating Sequence (AAS)
A sequence of atomic games
i ) i is an approximating sequence (AAS) for the nonatomic instance G= Θ,T, (X θ ) θ ,c, (u θ ) θ if for each ν ∈ N, there exists a partition of cardinal I (ν) of the set Θ, denoted by (Θ (ν) i ) i∈I (ν) , and if the sequence (G (ν) ) ν has the limits:
0 where δ i is the Hausdorff distance (denoted by d H ) between nonatomic feasibility sets and the scaled atomic feasibility set:
between the gradient of nonatomic utility functions and the scaled atomic utility functions:
From Def. 5 it is not trivial to build an AAS of a given nonatomic game G, one can even not be sure that such a sequence may exist. However, we will give practical examples in Secs. III-D.1 and III-D.2.
A direct result from the assumptions in Def. 5 is that the players become infinitesimal, as stated in Lemma 1 below.
) ν is an AAS of a nonatomic instance G, then considering the maximal diameter M of X θ , we have:
where P X θ is the projection on X θ for a θ ∈ Θ i .
) ν is an AAS of a nonatomic instance G, then the Hausdorff distance between the aggregate sets X = Θ X . and
is bounded by:
Proof. For a nonatomic profile (x θ ) θ , consider the projection on X
To ensure the convergence of an AAS, we make the following additional assumptions on the costs functions (c t ) t : In the following sections, we differentiate the cases with and without utilities, as we found different convergence results in the two cases.
B. Players without Utility Functions: Convergence of the Aggregate Equilibrium Profiles
In this section, we assume that u θ ≡ 0 for each θ ∈ Θ. We give a first result on the approximation of WE by a sequence of NEs in Thm. 6 below.
Thm 6. Let (G (ν) ) ν be an AAS of a nonatomic instance G, satisfying Asms. 1, 2, 4, 6 and 7. Let (x (ν) ) be a sequence of NE associated to (G (ν) ), and (x * θ ) θ a WE of G. Then:
Proof. Consider the projection of profileX onto X and, conversely, that of Θ
i . Apply (8) and (9) and use Lemmas 1 and 2. See [17] for the details.
C. Players with Utility Functions: Convergence of the Individual Equilibrium Profiles
In order to establish a convergence theorem in presence of utility functions, we make an additional assumption of strong monotonicity on the utility functions (Asm. 8). Note that this assumption holds for the functions given in Ex. 2.
Asm 8. Strongly concave utilities For all θ ∈ Θ, u θ is strongly concave on B 0 (M ), uniformly in θ: there exists α > 0 such that for all x, y ∈ B 0 (M ) 2 and any τ ∈]0, 1[ :
is α θ -strongly concave, then the negative of its gradient is a strongly monotone operator:
We start by showing that, under the additional Asm. 8 on the utility functions, the WE profiles of two nonatomic users within the same subset Θ i , we have:
Proof. Apply Prop. 2 to x * θ and x * ξ . See [17] for proof.
From this result we can see the role of the strong concavity of the utility functions: when α → 0, the right hand side of the inequality diverges. This is coherent with the fact that, without individual utilities, only the aggregate profile matters, so that we cannot have a result such as Prop. 3.
) be a sequence of NE of (G (ν) ), and (x * θ ) θ the WE of G. Under Asms. 1 to 6 and 8, the approximating solution x (ν)
Proof. We use the VI formulations of equilibria (4) and (7) and the monotonicity of c and ∇u θ . See [17] for proof.
As in Prop. 3, the uniform strong concavity of the utility functions plays a key role in the convergence of the individual profiles (x (ν) θ ) ν to the nonatomic WE profile x * .
D. Construction of an Approximating Sequence
We give examples of construction of an AAS for a nonatomic game G in two cases: 1) piecewise continuous functions and 2) finite-dimensional parameters. Note that this second case is very generic for practical problems, as in general we deal with finite dimensional descriptions of practical situations. 1) piecewise continuous parameters, uniform splitting: In this case, we assume that the parameters of the nonatomic game are piecewise continuous functions of θ ∈ Θ: there exists a finite set of K discontinuity points 0
. . . K} with σ 0 = 0 and σ K+1 = 1, then for any ε 1 > 0 and ε 2 > 0, there exists a modulus of uniform continuity η > 0 :
For ν ∈ N * , consider the ordered set of I ν cutting points (υ
∪ {σ k } 1≤k≤K and define the parti-
Prop 4. For ν ∈ N * , consider the atomic game G (ν) defined with I (ν) := {1 . . .I ν }, and for each i ∈ I (ν) :
is an AAS of the nonatomic game
The conditions of Def. 5 can be verified using the piecewise continuity conditions (13) stated above.
2) Finite dimension, meshgrid approximation: Let us consider that we have a nonatomic routing game G = (Θ, X , F ) (Def. 3) satisfying the following two hypothesis:
• the feasibility sets are K-dimensional polytopes: there exist A ∈ M K,T (R) and b : Θ → R K bounded, such that for any θ, X θ := {x ∈ R T ; Ax ≤ b θ }, with X θ nonempty and bounded (as a polytope, X θ is closed and convex),
• there exist a bounded function s : Θ → R q and a function u : R q ×B 0 (M ) → R such that for any θ ∈ Θ, u θ = u(s θ , .). Furthermore, u is Lipschitz-continuous in s.
Let us define b k := min θ b θ,k and b k := max θ b θ,k for k ∈ {1 . . . K} and define similarly s k , s k for k ∈ {1 . . . q}.
For ν ∈ N * , we consider the uniform meshgrid of ν
which will give us a set of I (ν) = ν K+q subsets. More explicitly, if we define:
the set of indices for the meshgrid, and with the cutting points
n of Θ as:
As some of the subsets Θ (ν)
n can be of Lebesgue measure 0, we define the set of players I (ν) as the elements n of
If there is a set of players of positive measure that have equal parameters b and s, then the condition max i∈I (ν) µ i → 0 will not be satisfied. In that case, adding another dimension in the meshgrid by cutting Θ = [0, 1] in ν uniform segments solves the problem.
n ) n ν is an AAS of G. The convergence of the utility functions relies on the Lipschitz continuity of s → u(s, x). The convergence of the feasibility sets relies on the following nontrivial result: Lemma 3. Given A ∈ M K,T (R), define the parameterized polyhedra Λ b := {x ∈ R T ; Ax ≤ b} for b in a bounded set B. Then there exists a constant C 0 > 0 such that:
Rem 4. Instead of using the average value on Θ (ν) n in Prop. 5, one could consider any value within the set Θ (ν) n .
IV. NUMERICAL APPLICATION
We consider a population of consumers Θ = [0, 1] with an energy demand distribution θ → E θ . Each consumer θ splits her demand over T := {O, P }, so that her feasibility set is X θ := {(x θ,O , x θ,P ) ∈ R 2 + |x θ,O + x θ,P = E θ }. The index O stands for offpeak-hours with a lower price c O (X) = X and P are peak-hours with a higher price c P (X) = 1 + 2X. The energy demand and the utility function in the nonatomic game are chosen as the piecewise continuous functions:
, with y θ = (0, E θ ) the preference of user θ for period P . Due to the infinite number of players types and the nonlinear parameters, there is no direct way to compute the WE. We consider approximating atomic games by splitting Θ uniformly (Sec. III-D.1) in 5, 20, 40 and 100 segments (players). We compute the NE for each atomic game using the best-response dynamics (each best-response is computed as a QP [19] ) and until the KKT optimality conditions for each player are satisfied up to an absolute error of 10 −3 . Fig. 2 shows the load for each NE on the peak period x θ,P (red filled area), while the load on the offpeak period can be observed as x θ,O = E θ − x θ,P . We observe the convergence to the limit WE of the nonatomic game as stated in Thm. 7. We also observe that the only discontinuity point of θ → x * θ,P comes from the discontinuity of θ → E θ at θ = 0.7. Indeed, the continuity of x * θ where θ → u θ and θ → X θ are continuous can be derived from Prop. 3.
CONCLUSION
This paper gives quantitative results on the convergence of Nash equilibria, associated to atomic games approximating a nonatomic routing game, to the Wardrop equilibrium of this nonatomic game. Those results are obtained under different differentiability and monotonicity assumptions. The given results have been extended, with a more complex analysis, to the general framework of aggregative games [20] , which includes in particular the case of routing games on an arbitrary network. An interesting direction for further research would be the case of nonmonotone functions. The WE is not shown as there is no direct way to compute it, but it can be guessed, from Thm. 7, as the limit of the NE profiles.
